

Political Parties as Campaign Organizations

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Introduction: Political Parties as Campaign Organizations

Elections lie at the heart of the relationship between parties and democracy. Just as it is impossible to conceive of a definition of (representative) democracy which does not place elections center-stage, so it is also difficult to conceive of a definition of parties which does not place stress on their electoral function. This latter point is shown, for instance, by Sartori (1976: 64) in his famous “minimal definition” of a party, as “any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office.” Given this close (and, indeed, with the possible exception of the candidate-centered U.S. system, symbiotic) relationship between parties and elections, it is important to have a clear idea both of how parties operate in elections, and of how elections affect parties. Furthermore, given the ongoing developments in campaign professionalization, evidently the relationship between parties and elections must have some dynamic.

There is already an extensive (single-case and cross-national) literature on the professionalization of campaigning, which in-part deals with the interface between election campaigning and political parties (for overviews see Bowler and Farrell 1992; Butler and Ranney 1992; Farrell 1996; Swanson and Mancini 1996). This issue tends to be dealt with in terms of the debate over “party decline,” for the most part at a rather general level; and, to-date, there has been little attention to the internal, organizational consequences for parties of changing campaign techniques. Both issues are considered in this paper.

The paper proceeds in two main parts. Section I outlines the main aspects of change in the nature of election campaigning, pointing to clues of how this may be affecting parties. This is followed, in section II, by a more detailed examination of those aspects of campaign change which appear to have most fundamental consequences both for how parties operate internally, as well as for their role in the political system more generally.

I. Three stages in the professionalization of campaigning

Two points are worth stressing at the outset. First, we recognize that developments in campaigning and party professionalization are not occurring in a vacuum; they are mediated by cultural and institutional circumstances, both at a systemic and at a party level (see below). Second, we want to avoid placing undue stress on the technological aspects of

campaign change, as this can lead to a tendency to focus only on, what might be termed, the “mechanics” of campaigning – i.e. on what campaigns are – and to give insufficient attention to, what might be termed, the “message” of the campaign – i.e. on what campaigns are about.¹ This relates to a common criticism by political marketing specialists of the political science treatments of campaign professionalization (e.g., *European Journal of Marketing* 1996; O’Shaughnessy 1990; Scammell 1995). They argue that the analysis of campaign change in much of the political science literature tends to be unfocused and incomplete, and it is for this reason that there is often a dispute over the extent to which campaigns really have been changing.² The political marketing literature places great stress on the need to develop an all-encompassing model of campaigning, and in particular one which recognizes the central importance of the “campaign message.”

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

At the risk of over-simplification, the professionalization of election campaigning can be broken down into three main stages. The precise characteristics of these stages are dealt with elsewhere (Farrell 1996). In this paper, we divide the analysis into three main areas where campaign changes can be seen to have affected parties most distinctly: technical, resources, and thematic developments. Table 1 provides a rough summary of these three areas of campaign change over time.³

The first stage of campaigning was characterized by the following. First, in the case of technical features of campaigning, there was little or sporadic preparation, and communication tended to be through party press, posters, mass rallies and canvassing. Second, in terms of resources, there was a heavy use of traditional party bureaucracies and volunteer activists, a focus on the local campaign with little centralization or coordination, and more value was placed on intuition than on objective feedback. Third, in terms of

¹ If anything, it would probably be most accurate to characterize the approach being adopted here as “soft technological determinism” (Smith and Marx 1994).

² It is not all that difficult to find examples of “new” campaign practices in elections earlier in the century (a point stressed by such authors as Bartels 1992; Dionne 1976). According to the political marketing literature, it is a mistake to treat certain aspects of campaign change in isolation; there is a need to adopt an all-encompassing approach.

³ For an earlier version of this Table, which refers to the three stages as “premodern,” “television revolution,” and “telecommunications revolution,” see Farrell (1996). Pippa Norris (1996) refers to

themes, “events” were staged around the use of the party leader in public rallies and whistlestop tours to boost the campaign efforts of the local politicians. The target audience was made up of fixed social categories, resulting in a greater emphasis on “mobilization” than on “persuasion.” Campaign communications consisted primarily of propaganda, described by Wring as “a one-directional communication process in which passive audiences found themselves subjected to the sometimes manipulative appeals of political elites” (1996a: 102; also Shama 1976; Wring 1996).

The second stage of campaign professionalization was characterized most of all by the arrival of television. First, careful campaign preparation centered around the role of specialist campaign committees established long in advance of the election. There was an emphasis on television as a major means of communication, with leader and candidates being media-trained, and resources devoted to public relations. Great weight was attached to “indirect” modes of communication. Second, there was a professionalization of party bureaucracies (Panebianco 1986), bringing in media and marketing specialists, and the use of campaign consultants and agencies; these coincided with a nationalization of campaigning in which power and resources were concentrated at the center. Third, there was an emphasis on the party leader, and a focus on nationwide “standardization” and the “broadcasting” of a single campaign message. The parties were now seeking to catch votes from all social categories, therefore there tended to be less emphasis on “target” audiences (or, what Kirchheimer would refer to as the *class gardée*), and attention instead to a coordinated effort to attract a mass vote. Campaign communications involved “selling,” where some effort was made to test the market, but where ultimately the “product was sacrosanct;” the belief was that it is public opinion which was “malleable” (Scammell 1995: 9).⁴

The third main stage of campaign professionalization can be seen to have coincided with the arrival of new telecommunications technology (e.g., cable and satellite technology, and most

them as “premodern,” “modern,” and “postmodern.” To some extent, these three stages could be said to coincide with Katz and Mair’s (1995) distinction between “mass,” “catchall,” and “cartel” parties.

⁴ This aspect is given prime importance in the political marketing literature, in which it is seen as *the* factor which marks out a professional “marketing” campaign. For discussion of why the British Labour party’s 1987 campaign – viewed generally as the most “professional” of the campaigns in that election (e.g. Butler and Kavanagh 1988) – might be classified as *less* “professional” than the Conservatives’ campaign on the grounds that greater stress was placed on “selling” than on “marketing,” see O’Shaughnessy 1990; Scammell 1995.

recently the explosion of the internet) and its gradual incorporation into the machinery of campaigning. The suggestion is that the U.S. only started to enter this stage from about 1988 onwards (e.g., Abramson et al. 1988); arguably some European countries are only just entering this stage today. Its characteristics – as might be described in the context of a European (still party-centric) election – include the following. First, there is the arrival of “the permanent campaign,” with campaign preparations centered around well-established campaign departments. Greater weight is attached to more “direct” modes of communication, particularly those offered by cable TV and the internet. Second, the campaign organization is staffed by campaign professionals. There is also an extensive use of campaign consultants and agencies, in some instances sidelining established party apparatus (e.g. through the development and resourcing of a “leader’s office”), leading to questions over who is “in charge.” Third, there is greater attention to targeted campaign messages, to “narrowcasting,” with greater use of feedback and the adapting of the message to suit the audience. A full panoply of alternative communication devices is used to direct targeted campaign messages at specific categories of voters. As Wring (1996, 1996a) and others (Scammell 1995; Shama 1976) point out, campaign communications in this stage are much more consumer-oriented; now it is the *product* which is malleable. This seems to imply a model of party competition which is overwhelmingly preference-accommodating rather than preference-shaping, though it should be said that even here there must be some limits to the malleability of the product. For party policy appeals to remain credible, programmatic adaptation should remain within the bounds of enduring party policy reputations (Laver 1997: 136), or such pledges are likely to be discounted by skeptical voters. This in itself raises a concern of some interest to students of “party decline,” for if the major protagonists of party systems should lose all sense of persisting policy reputation, then they might be regarded as fundamentally opportunistic and vacuous by electors; this in turn exacerbates the risk of anti-party sentiment and party decline (Poguntke and Scarrow 1996; see also Deschouwer 1996).

A summary such as this risks being dismissed as an over-simplification. It is important, therefore, to set out two main qualifications. First, it is clearly a distortion to summarize the professionalization of campaigning in terms of three rather fixed stages. Real life does not work like this. Strictly speaking each row in Table 1 should more accurately be seen as a continuum along which campaign organizations are moving, from a “premodern” pole to an “advanced-modern” pole. Not all the changes are occurring at the same time (e.g., the

telecommunications revolution has gone through a number of stages, most recently centered around the internet). Furthermore, not all countries (or campaign organizations) fit the staged-pattern of change implied by Table 1, and, indeed, their campaigns may be changing at a different speed to the norm. This is best seen in the case of new European democracies, many of which skipped much of “stage 1” (Jakubowicz 1996; Mickiewicz and Richter 1996; Rospir 1996); it is also shown by the cases of some newly emerging democracies in Latin America which appear to have advanced faster and further into “stage 2” than many of the more advanced democracies of western Europe (Angell et al. 1992). Though clearly inspired by the real world, therefore, the threefold typological continuum is therefore essentially an heuristic device, a classificatory scheme of ideal types which serves to aid our understanding of campaign change.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

A second point of qualification is the need to take account of the crucial importance of the “environment” in which campaigning occurs. It seems pretty obvious that certain institutional (governmental system, electoral system, campaign laws, etc.) and cultural (e.g. localism) factors will affect the nature of campaigning and how it is changing (for discussion, see Farrell 1996; Swanson and Mancini 1996a). This is particularly pertinent in the case of U.S. campaigning which, in many respects, is unique. Given the fact that the U.S. is a candidate-centered system, where parties have been said to be “in decline” for thirty years or more (although there has been some recent “revisionism” in this debate), and where there are few significant limitations on how to campaign (e.g. total freedom on the purchase and airing of TV spots), it is clear that, in a number of respects, other countries are unlikely to follow certain campaign practices common in the U.S.. Therefore some of the cells in “stage 3” of Table 1 may never apply in certain cases. Japan and several of the other countries being considered in this project (e.g. Canada, France, and Italy) stand out in this respect, as revealed in Table 2 which provides a summary overview of some of the key environmental features under which political parties have to operate. Furthermore, given the lack of a party-centered tradition in the U.S., there are also a number of areas where U.S.

practice is bound to differ from the norm, say, in western Europe, also making it difficult to locate the U.S. case in all the cells of Table 1.⁵

II. Campaign professionalization and parties

In the previous section it was stressed that the relationship between parties and elections was complex, and ever-changing. In this section, we elaborate on the three main areas of campaign change – technical, resource, and thematic – which were sketched out above, each of which has had consequences for the parties. The influence on parties of campaign change is twofold, affecting their internal organizational structure (endogenously), as well as their external role in the political system (exogenously). Clearly the two effects are related; indeed, it might be argued that the former precedes the latter.

II.i. Technical changes

The two principal technical changes (occurring chronologically) have, of course, been the television, and the new communications technologies. The first of these has already received extensive coverage, enough to fill several library shelves. And it is likely that the full effect of TV has now been felt, so there is little need to speculate about it. Table 2 summarizes the state of play regarding access to and use of television in our range of countries. The virility symbol of the “TV Age,” the leader’s debate, is now a common occurrence in most cases; only Italy, Switzerland and the UK stand out as exceptions.⁶ The process of broadcasting deregulation and the emergence of new stations has had at least one consequence of relevance here, namely the relaxation of rules on campaign advertising, allowing parties to broadcast their own TV spots (Kaid and Holtz-Bacha 1995).

⁵ This discussion puts a somewhat different gloss on the debate about whether campaign professionalization should be seen as little more than a process of “Americanization,” implying that other countries are simply copying fashions set in the U.S. (for discussion, see Swanson and Mancini 1996a; Negrine and Papathanassopoulos 1996). If, in a number of respects, the evidence points to “American exceptionalism,” then it is difficult to see how the U.S. case can so easily be said to be setting the trends for others to follow.

⁶ In the UK, this is not for want of trying by the TV companies. In the past it was the incumbent prime minister who refused to debate his/her counterpart, usually on the grounds that it would only serve to help increase their credibility as “prime ministers in waiting.” The tables were turned in 1997, when because of very unfavorable poll trends, the outgoing prime minister, John Major, challenged the far more popular Labour leader, Tony Blair, to a TV debate. Blair ducked the issue, resulting in a Conservative tactic to have a man dressed up as a chicken follow Blair on the campaign trail. Intended to symbolize the Labour leader’s cowardice for avoiding a debate, the situation became

It is the more recent developments in new communications technologies which are of greater interest: in this paper we will seek to emphasize a number of points which bear upon their effects on parties in the campaign process. Before dealing with this, another area warranting attention is how technical change affects the parties' bank balances.

Technological development does not come cheaply; the contemporary campaign is an expensive business, as revealed most starkly by the debacle over the U.S. Democrats' fundraising efforts in 1996. There is plenty of evidence from single-case studies of the amount of money being spent today by parties on their election campaigns. For instance, official expenditure (seen as an underestimate) by candidates in the 1995 French presidential election totalled 426.91 million francs (over £53 million) (Machin 1996: 46); in the 1997 U.K. election the Conservative party spent more than £20 million (all the more impressive given that until a short time hitherto the party was still paying off a debt of about £20 million from the 1992 campaign, Butler and Kavanagh 1997: 242; more recent figures suggest that even this was an underestimate). The accumulation of comparative data on campaign finance is fraught with all sorts of difficulties, not least the fact that, unless required by law, the parties are extremely unwilling to volunteer information. In the Katz/Mair party organization project some effort was made to try and gather this information, and on occasions (mostly notably in the Italian case) warning notes were attached by the country-authors. With this in mind, Table 3 makes some effort to explore the trends.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

There are some pretty clear trends in Table 3. First, in virtually all cases, campaign expenditure is rising. When we look at the percentage changes from the 1970s to the 1980s, the (partial) exceptions are Italy, Austria, and Sweden; though the latter two cases end the period overall with higher campaign expenditure than at the start of the period. The Italian case is difficult to call generally when dealing with party finance. The scholars (Bardi and Morlino 1994) who gathered the data doubted their accuracy (a doubt which was dramatically confirmed, soon after they had completed their research, by the "clean hands" crisis). Second, it is interesting to note that the two cases which show fastest growth, the U.K. and Ireland, are also the only cases where political parties do not receive state funding.

farcical when Labour retaliated by producing their own headless chicken supposed to symbolize the state of the Conservative government.

Third, what evidence is available suggests that expenditure is, for the most part, continuing to rise again in the 1990s.⁷

A closer examination of the underlying trends, from election to election, reveal a number of interesting patterns. First the largest fluctuations in campaign expenditure seem to occur in the 1960s and 1970s, suggestive perhaps of a general process of campaign professionalization which was occurring in these years (a point confirmed in the comparative studies on campaigning, see Bowler and Farrell 1992; Butler and Ranney 1992). Second, the “steady-state” period was in the first part of the 1980s, with expenditure levels rising gradually and relatively consistently, suggestive perhaps of a brief period of campaign equilibrium. Towards the end of the decade and into the 1990s, levels of campaign expenditure start jumping again, perhaps indicative of further developments in campaign professionalization.

To get some kind of impression of campaign technical change in western European parties, a questionnaire was circulated to the authors of chapters in the Bowler and Farrell (1992) volume, and this is in the process of being up-dated by another questionnaire sent out in the past month (only a handful of returns have come in at this point, and so this discussion is still quite tentative and incomplete). Responses to these questionnaires reveal the following main points about the role of technology in the contemporary election campaign. For the most part, a lot of use is made of opinion polls and other survey data by parties both in preparing and coordinating their campaigns. Where there are no or few polls, this is generally due to a lack of funds. It is the Green parties who on the whole tend to have some form of ideological hang-up about the use of surveys (though the fact that these parties are small and relatively underresourced must also be a factor). Danish parties also tend to be light on the use of opinion polls, consistent with the comments of Bille and his colleagues (1992: 79) that “Danish parties are reluctant to make use of many of the paraphernalia of contemporary campaigns;” and also consistent with the relatively low levels spent on campaigning when compared with countries of similar size (Table 3).

⁷ Some figures are available, but unfortunately the World Tables series stopped providing the cost of living delators after 1993 (which provides 1991 estimates), and so we need to find other means to make these transformations. In the next draft of this paper we propose to disaggregate the figures in Table 3 by party.

In his classic study of “campaign rationality,” Rose (1967) places great stress on the distinction between the commissioning of polls and the actual use made of them. There is some evidence from our questionnaire returns of campaigns being changed as a result of poll findings. For the most part, this tends to occur in the right-of-center parties,⁸ consistent with the view that a shift towards new campaign styles is easier for parties on the center-right which are less burdened by ideological baggage. Of course, in those cases where the campaign did not appear adaptable, it may be that the poll evidence did not suggest the need for campaign change, or that there was little time; both of these factors were relevant in several cases.

There is no readily discernible pattern on the use of direct mailing and targeted advertising, a feature of the “stage 3” campaign (though here we are relying, for now, on rather dated evidence from the early 1990s). In general, parties in Austria, Britain and Germany make use of both; there is more sporadic use of these techniques in Denmark and Ireland; in Finland at the start of the decade parties used direct mail but not targeted advertisements, while in the Netherlands parties used targeted advertisements but not direct mail.

The “Television Age” ushered in nationalized campaigning, with an emphasis on the broadcasting of single, coordinated nationwide messages. In sharp contrast, the “Digital Age” looks like causing something of a reversion in the culture of campaigning back towards more focused, localized, targeted communication. The name of the game will now be narrowcasting, or what Bonchek (1997) refers to as “netcasting.” A number of interrelated communications technologies are involved, each contributing in its own way to the same effect. These include cable and satellite technology, the digital revolution, and, of course, the internet (Abramson et al. 1988). It is the latter development (particularly what it offers through E-mail and the World Wide Web, or WWW) which currently is attracting most interest. Of course, the extent to which these new technologies have spread represents a constraint on party trends towards the “stage 3” model of campaigning. In the UK, for instance, a majority of citizens do not as yet have cable or satellite TV; even if they do, the quality of local or regional news programmes is unlikely to be sufficient to induce many to rely on these in preference to the main terrestrial networks. Similarly, initial research

⁸ In Finland, the Social Democrats and the Left-Wing Alliance also appear to have campaign strategies which are adaptable in the light of poll trends. It is interesting to note that most of the Finnish parties share the same polling agency, Finnish Gallup (Sundberg and Högnabba 1992).

suggests that the internet made a very limited impact on the first general election campaign in which the parties consciously sought to exploit its possibilities (Gibson and Ward 1997). Nevertheless, the potential of these new technologies to impact significantly on the future of political campaigns cannot be overlooked.

We only need to look at the use of web sites by the U.S. presidential candidates in the 1996 election to obtain a sense of this; in particular, Bob Dole made a concerted effort to use his web site as a means of countering his image as too old and dodderly (though this initiative was perhaps not helped by his inability to remember the correct address). Research showed that Dole's web site was accessed more than 3 million times in the first six months of its operation (Corrado 1996). Phil Gramm's web site was accessed almost 200,000 times – at a set-up cost of just \$8,000. Gramm claimed that he made eight times as many contacts with the public by way of the WWW as he could have made with first-class mail (Just 1997). Clearly having a web site has become *the* important new political campaign tool for any self-respecting candidate (on this point, see the discussion in *Campaigns & Elections* July 1996; see also “.Netpulse” on <http://www.politicsonline.com/news>).

In terms of statistics, the evidence is pretty staggering. At the start of the 1980s barely 300 computers were linked to the internet. By the end of the decade the number had risen to 90,000. Today, some 40 million people are estimated to be connected to the internet, half of these in the U.S. According to Westen (1996: 59), 1995 marks the start of the “Digital Age,” when for the first time “personal computers outsold television sets; the number of E-mail messages surpassed surface mail messages; and data traffic over telephone networks ... exceeded voice traffic.”

The fastest growing part of the internet is the WWW. In 1993 there were 130 web sites; by 1996 this had jumped to 230,000. From the beginning the web has grown at an exponential rate, doubling every 3 months. Depending on which survey you look at, today somewhere between 20-25 percent of Americans have access to the internet either at home or at work. A study by the Pew Research Centre (1996) during the 1996 campaign revealed the following: 21 million Americans (12 percent of the voting age population) obtained political or policy news from the internet during the year, and about 7 million (4 percent) sought information specifically on the presidential campaign. Post-election research found that 3 percent of voters said the internet was their principal election news source. Clearly this is one

prominent area where U.S. campaigns are far in advance of the situation in western Europe. It may be the case that virtually all parties today have their own web sites, but we have yet to see the kind of use being made of them during election campaigns that was evident in the U.S. in 1996.

The internet fills a communications gap, and if nothing else this means it will provide a new link between politicians and voters. In his review of the different families of media, Bonchek (1997) finds that the internet is a distinctive communications medium in a number of respects, notably in the fact that it is so cheap to access and relatively cheap to use (as a communicator); and that it combines the role of a personal, group and broadcast modes of communication. Neuman's (1991) research (slightly predating the internet) suggests one area where the internet could make a significant contribution to political communications. He distinguishes between two extreme areas of communications: interpersonal, and national communication, and he suggests that one area where we are likely to see further developments (which is where the internet would fit in nicely) is in "mini-communication." The principal point he is stressing is that the new media technology (whether the internet, or more generally) will not replace existing forms of communication; rather, it will supplement them.

It is possible to paint a picture of a future campaign in "cyberworld" where the plethora of web sites, listservs and news groups and the extensive E-mail exchange between interested voters means that there is an explosion in the amount of campaign information available to the voters. Just such a picture is painted by a number of the authors writing in this field (e.g., see the speculative pieces in Corrado and Firestone 1996). And it is not entirely unbelievable. If, for the moment, we believe it, what consequences does it have for the election campaign? It could be that yet more voters become "turned off" politics as there are so many other more interesting things available; on the other hand, it is at least as likely that it would further enhance the "cognitive mobilization" of voters (Barnes, Kaase et al. 1979; Dalton 1996). This in turn could generate a rise in feelings of political efficacy and competence on the part of citizens, and demands for further "participatory" opportunities. Such a scenario would probably test the agenda-setting capacity of political parties even further than it already has been challenged in the televisual age, and if parties are unable to respond effectively, then there is always the potential for growing popular dissatisfaction.

At this stage, of course, this discussion must remain speculative, but even so, it is hard not to be struck by the potential for significant change inherent within the new media.

Of course, the problem with the scenario presented so far, is that it assumes a lot. The research by Margolis et al. (1997) on the use of the WWW by mainstream candidates in 1996 showed clearly how cyberspace is “replicating” the real world, i.e., things appear to be settling into a new equilibrium with the established parties still in control. Russell Neuman (1991) has developed this point more generally. His thesis is that the expansionary tensions provoked by the “communications revolution” have to contend with the dampening down pressures of the “psychology of the mass audience” (principally its inbuilt low interest in politics), and the “political economy of the mass media” (where economies of scale and concentration of ownership ensure that the media equilibrium is maintained). In this context, the conclusion may well be that little really changes.

The Margolis and Neuman reservations to one side, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the internet will have implications for the nature of campaign discourse. Given that the internet is based first and foremost on text retrieval and dissemination, and given also the tendency for graphics to overload and slowdown the network (though this may prove to be a teething problem), its significance must lie primarily as an informational resource which will enhance the cognitive political awareness of citizens. This tends to imply a prominent place for issues and “serious” image questions related to the credibility and trustworthiness of parties and candidates (see below).

The internet might also have a role to play in developing more targeted debates. The centralizing tendencies of television and the “modern” campaign led to a reduced emphasis on local issues and more attention to the national debate, and to national issues. By its nature, the internet tends to eschew geographically-focused communication (because, for instance, literally by one click of a mouse you can jump from one part of the globe to another, but also because listservs and newsgroups tend to encourage issues-oriented debates, bringing people together on the basis of particular issues rather than the locale or district where they happen to be living, though clearly this happens also). So we may not be about to see a return to a more “local” emphasis in campaigning, but undoubtedly we could see a greater targeting on specific issues.

II.ii. Resource and personnel changes

New technology requires new technicians. As we know from the well-documented U.S. experience, political consultancy has been a major growth industry. In the more party-centered west European systems we can expect somewhat different patterns (Farrell 1998). In western Europe, there have been three particularly notable developments. The first of these is revealed by a quantitative examination of the resources available to parties, and shows a growing strength of central party organizations. To this we can add two parallel changes of a more qualitative nature, incorporating the emergence of “party leaders’ offices” and the growing “professionalization” of campaign staff. These qualitative trends probably complement the quantitative developments by further enhancing the capacity of central party elites to coordinate and control campaign activities. We shall consider each of the developments in turn.

II.ii.a. Quantitative trends in party resourcing

Our survey of quantitative trends takes in both the funding and the personnel available to political parties. It is far from easy to obtain reliable comparative longitudinal data on some of these variables (especially staffing levels), but the Katz/Mair handbook (1992) provides us with as good a source as one could reasonably expect to find. These data cover 42 parties from nine west European democracies, although we do not have information for every variable in the case of each party.⁹ The figures for Norway and Denmark are based on four-year averages which correspond more closely with the electoral cycles of these countries.

⁹The gaps which exist in the data mean that we are reduced to: 41 parties (in all 9 countries) for which we have central staff time-series data, 25 parties (across 7 countries) for which we have sub-national time-series data, 35 parties (in 8 countries) for which we have parliamentary time-series data, 35 parties (in 9 countries) for which we have time-series data on overall central party income, and 29 parties (in 8 countries) for time-series data on central party income derived from state subsidies. For the most part, the data are based on 5-yearly averages between 1960 and 1989. Moreover, calculations for parties in Italy and the U.S. have not been included here. In the Italian case, no time trend data are available for the three main parties covered by the period (the Socialists, Communists and Christian Democrats, the latter two of which were almost certainly among the best resourced of any European political parties during the three decades following 1960); given that this is the case, the available data can only provide a highly misleading impression of the overall situation in this country. The American data are fraught with rather different problems. There are often difficulties in comparing American parties with their European counterparts, of course; in this context, the question arises as to which elements of the respective party organizations might constitute the “central” and “parliamentary” parties. Overall, it is hard to disagree with the view of Kolodny and Katz, who argue that party staffing in the USA is “extraordinarily hard to estimate” for a variety of reasons, including: “...widespread sharing or loaning of employees...idiosyncratic and highly variable decisions about whom to include in staff lists, and...the time of the year or point in the election cycle at which the estimate is made” (1992: 888).

However, in running from the 1960s to 1990, the data cover more than one of the three stages of campaign development we outlined at the start of this paper, and in the case of some countries, arguably all three. We have selected five key indicators of party resourcing, the trends among which are reported in Table 4. This table incorporates information about the changing number of staff employed at three different levels of party organization – the central party, the sub-national party and the parliamentary party – and about changes in the overall level of income and state funding available to central parties.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

If we focus on staffing levels first, it is clear enough from a fairly cursory glance at Table 4 that the majority of parties considered have increased the number of staff that they employ, especially at the central and parliamentary levels (see especially the rows labelled “summary of national change”). Indeed, just five out of 41 parties shed staff from their central headquarters, and of these only the Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal did so to a notable extent.¹⁰ At the parliamentary level the upward trend is even more clear-cut; only the Norwegian Socialist People's Party appears to have lost staff at all, and again, these losses are far from notable. However, at sub-national level things are different; just nine out of 25 parties show net growth across time and the three British parties have clearly undergone dramatic local staff wastage. On average, then, all the countries featured in the Katz/Mair data set, show growth in central and parliamentary staffing, and there are few distinctive national developments; although the Federal Republic of Germany appears to be in a league of its own in respect of the massive growth of its parliamentary parties.¹¹ By contrast, not one of the countries for which we have been able to calculate national averages shows decisive growth in sub-national staffing, although the Nordic countries come closest to achieving this (especially Norway and Finland); all other systems show staff shrinkage at the local level, the UK massively so. Allowing for the relative paucity of data at the sub-national level, these data suggest that this is the one area which parties have neglected (or been unable) to develop in terms of the deployment of personnel. Allied to the almost

¹⁰ Note that the CDA's figures are based on change from the aggregated figures of its predecessor parties (ARP, KVP, CHU).

¹¹ An important caveat must be issued regarding the German data, since they incorporate part-time employees whereas data from other countries do not.

universal decline of party membership numbers since the 1960s (Katz, Mair et al. 1992), this points to a general decline of party organizations at the local level in Western countries.

However, that such a development does not generally apply to national party headquarters is confirmed by reference to the data on financial resources. 21 of the 35 parties, and five out of nine countries, for which we have time-series data, show financial growth in real terms from the mid-1970s to late 1980s (comparing election years only). Again, the Nordic area (in this case, Sweden, Norway and Finland) and – more surprisingly, perhaps – West Germany stand out against the tendency of central party real incomes growth. To set this in context, however, we should note that German, Swedish and Finnish parties were among the richest in Europe at the beginning of the period analyzed and remained relatively wealthy at the end (see Table 5). They have hardly, therefore, become impoverished.

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

The data on subsidies to central parties are interesting in so far as they bear directly on one of the most widely discussed concepts to emerge in the recent literature on western political parties, namely Katz and Mair's "cartel party" (1995). On face of it, of course, there is something curious about the growing organizational strength (measured in central party staffing and funding) that so many parties display, for it is widely observed that Western parties are losing their capacity to penetrate society and mobilize the loyal support of citizens. The huge literature on such features of modern political behavior as electoral volatility, partisan dealignment and membership decline are testament to this development (see section 1 of this volume?). Yet if this is so, then we are faced with something of a paradox, for how can parties continue to thrive organizationally *in spite* of their declining basis of social support? One obvious explanation for the paradox is provided by the cartel party thesis, which contends that established parties exploit the state itself as an alternative font of organizational resources:

In short, the state, which is invaded by the parties and the rules of which are determined by the parties, becomes a fount of resources through which these parties not only help to ensure their own survival, but through which they can also enhance their capacity to resist challenges from newly mobilized alternatives. The state, in

this sense, becomes an institutionalized structure of support, sustaining insiders while excluding outsiders (Katz and Mair 1995: 16).

The final column in Table 4 bears upon this in that it reports the changing quantities of state subvention flowing to party central offices. This shows that the real value of such funds increased for 17 of the 29 parties analyzed, while the average state subsidy increased in real terms for five of the eight countries. Again, the countries where the real value of subsidies fell are those which headed the European league of subventions at the start of the time-series (Germany, Sweden and Finland), and again they remained high in the rankings at the end. Interestingly, the extent to which parties depend on the state for central office income tended to grow over the periods analyzed. Only in the case of Sweden was there a notable reduction in the level of financial dependency on the state; elsewhere it either increased or remained virtually static (see Table 5).

II.ii.b. Qualitative developments in party resourcing

The qualitative developments which have affected the resourcing of European parties as campaign organizations are more recent in origin. Of particular note are: (1) the gradual emergence of the “party leader’s office” staffed by handpicked campaign, media and policy specialists working directly to the party leader, and (2) the increasing reliance on specialist campaign agencies and political consultants. Together, these trends constitute what is often referred to as “the professionalization” of party campaigning (as in Panebianco’s “electoral-professional” ideal-type). As always, there is some variation between the different cases, based on particular circumstances: e.g., it is far easier for Tony Blair as *the* leader of the British Labour Party to establish such an office than it is for, say, Gerhard Schröder at the German SPD.¹² Some attempt was made to explore these developments in our survey of national experts. For the most part, at this point in the early 1990s, the parties were still using ad hoc campaign bodies rather than permanent standing committees or departments. The few exceptions were the Danish Christian People’s Party and three left-of-centre parties (British Labour, the Danish Social-Liberals, and the Left-Wing Alliance in Finland). It should be noted however, that in many of the cases where ad hoc bodies ran the campaign, the preparations for it were arranged by permanent or semi-permanent bodies made up of teams of experts and campaign specialists. The numbers actually involved in campaign

coordination, where known, were very small, across the sample averaging about eight people based around the party leadership.¹³

Apart from the ubiquitous advertising agencies, there is rather mixed evidence about the use of outside agencies and consultants. Apparently, in the early 1990s, none of the parties made use of them in Denmark, the Netherlands, or Germany. In Britain only the Conservatives appeared to use such expertise, though by the end of the decade, Labour was also making extensive use of agencies and consultants, even to the extent of importing one or two individuals from Bill Clinton's team in the run-up to the 1997 general election (George Stephanopolous, for instance). In Germany (and hitherto in the British Labour Party) this seems to reflect the fact that the parties have tended to employ their own specialists "in house." This is also true to some extent of the other cases, though it possibly also reflects a degree of reluctance to make full use of the service of specialists in general (Farrell 1998). Of the few cases where parties included outside experts in their campaign coordination, only in Austria (and to an extent in the Irish Fine Gael party) were these consultants incorporated on a formal basis; in other words, only in those cases can one talk of outside consultants and agencies having a potentially very significant role in campaign decision-making.

As writers like Panebianco (1988), and Katz and Mair (1995) have shown in their discussions of the electoral-professional and cartel party models, these changes in campaign personnel reflect a general shift in the internal power relations within parties, with the parliamentary face, and especially that part of it intimately associated with the party leadership, emerging as the main power house. What this may amount to, at its most extreme, is a change in the culture of political parties away from their "mass" traditions (particularly symbolic in the case of the left-of-center parties with their origins as "social encapsulators") where stress is played on a large and activist membership which plays an important role during election campaigns as resource provider (party dues) and campaign communicator. In its place emerges a new role for parties as campaign machines operating in support of the principal

¹²As the U.K. campaign histories show, Tony Blair's hold over his party is a relatively recent luxury for Labour leaders (Kavanagh 1995; Scammell 1995).

¹³Inevitably, the Finnish Left-Wing Alliance, as a new party with a rather decentralized structure (Sundberg and Högnabba 1992), had a much larger number of people involved in campaign coordination.

candidates, even as “empty vessels” – a role which the US parties appear to play today (Herrnson 1988; Katz and Kolodny 1994).

II.iii. Thematic changes

Changes in campaign theme have been of two main forms: presidentialization, and shifts in what the political marketing specialists would call “campaign communication.” The first point is virtually incontrovertible. Right across western Europe (to say nothing, for instance, of the presidential political systems of Latin America) there has been a distinct shift in campaign focus, with much greater attention focused on the party leader. To a large degree this process has been fed by television and its requirements. We saw in the previous section how parties have been concentrating their resources at the center, largely based around the party leadership. Clearly, as argued above, this trend reflects a power-shift within political parties. But it also is suggestive of a change in the nature of campaign discourse, with image and style increasingly pushing policies and substance aside.

By the start of the 1990s, in most countries the party leader had emerged as a central focus of parties’ campaigns. Clearly, there may be a number of factors determining whether the party leader is not a “dominant,” but rather a “major” theme, not least the issue of his or her personal popularity and/or tendency to tread on banana skins. The relevant distinction for our purposes is whether the leader is merely a “minor” theme. This would appear to be an important point distinguishing the decentralized campaign from the centralized one.

Related to the emphasis on image in campaigns has been a general shift in the nature of campaign communications, which is rather usefully encapsulated by the political marketing literature as a shift from “selling” to “marketing.” As the means of accumulating feedback has become more sophisticated, and the desire to test opinion more ever-present (in part pushed by new campaign specialists familiar with the techniques of the marketplace), there has been a perceptible shift in the politician’s psyche from treating politics as an “art” to treating it instead as a “science.” The initial standpoint used to be one of setting the “product” (usually based on some predetermined ideology) and seeking to steer public opinion in the direction of favoring this product over that being offered by other parties (the “selling” approach to campaign communications). Saliency theory (Budge and Farlie 1983) argued that certain types of parties “owned” certain types of policies (e.g., defence for the right and health policy for the left) around which they centered their campaigns.

Today, the initial standpoint increasingly appears to be one of finding out what the public want to hear and designing the product accordingly (the “marketing” approach to campaign communications). In the context of centralized party resources which facilitate carefully coordinated campaigns, this is probably enhancing the strategic autonomy and flexibility of leaderships. The policy movement which this helps foster may enhance the responsiveness of parties to popular demands, but it may also render enduring policy reputations harder to identify; in the U.K., for instance, it has even reached the situation where the Labour leader can accuse the Conservative party of being “soft on crime,” and many expect Schroeder to have a similar impact on the German SPD. This trend seems destined to continue as the traditional party hierarchies are replaced by brash new professionals whose primary loyalty is to the leader rather than to an ideology or a party tradition.

III. Conclusion

Political parties have invested heavily in election campaigning, making full use of new technologies, adapting their organizations and employing specialist agencies and consultants. As a result, the party of today, and the way it operates in the context of electioneering, is a significantly different creature to that of twenty years ago. This chapter has pointed, above all, to three major developments in parties as campaign organizations: first, parties have tended to become more centralized and professionalized; second, they have become more aware of citizen opinion and demands; and third, party and (especially) leader image has come to assume a prominent thematic role in campaigning. From each of these we might derive speculative insights into the nature of democratic change.

From the centralization of parties and the decline of local party organizations which seem implicit in contemporary formulations such as the electoral-professional and cartel party models (and which are borne out by the available evidence to a substantial degree), we might conclude that the nature of political participation by ordinary citizens is changing. Fewer individuals now enact political roles as loyal party members, preferring instead to participate via non-partisan single-issue groups. Moreover, if the new media technologies have even half the effects currently being predicted for them, this tendency may only be reinforced. At its most extreme, some have foreseen a return to some form of direct

democracy centered around the communication capabilities of the new media (Abramson et al. 1988; Grossman 1995). In such a scenario it is hard to see what kind of role there will be for political parties.

However, it would be unrealistic to be too easily seduced by these visions at this stage. More likely, perhaps, is the survival of both parties and representative democracy, albeit in adapted forms: thus, for example, we might expect greater use of referendums and public initiatives, far greater attention to the accumulation of citizen-feedback, and possibly moves towards “more complex, two-way electronic interactions on individual issues” (Budge 1996: 132). Parties, however, have proven adaptable and resilient entities up to now, and may well adapt again to this new scenario; after all, they are still likely to remain the principal conduit for political recruitment, demand aggregation and control of government. Moreover, notwithstanding the compelling evidence of local organizational atrophy, it should not be assumed that parties have concluded that individual memberships are an irrelevant anachronism, nor that local members lack any significant impact on the policy process or electoral outcomes; the persuasive evidence of authors such as Scarrow (1996) and Seyd and Whiteley (1991, 1994) suggests that party members are still important in a number of respects.¹⁴

From the evidence of the growing sophistication of party efforts to tap public opinion, it might also be tempting to conclude that parties are in decline in another sense, i.e., that they are increasingly unprincipled, opportunistic power-seekers who will fail to offer voters clear or meaningful choices. Again, however, caution is in order. The bold transformations of European social democracy that seem inherent in the projects of Blair and Schroeder, and which so captivate media commentators, should not obscure the painstaking efforts of political scientists who have demonstrated repeatedly that parties “almost always maintain the same ideological positions in relation to each another and in fact change policy remarkably little” (Budge 1996: 131). Furthermore, it would be unwise to assume that parties never seek to mould, rather than simply follow, voter preferences – especially once they are in power. Patrick Dunleavy, for instance, has demonstrated convincingly that there are a number of ways in which parties controlling the levers of government (and a few in which

¹⁴ Though, it is worth noting that “virtual” parties have arrived. See, for example, the web site of the new Italian party, Nuovo Movimento (<http://www.nuovo-movimento.com>).

parties remain in opposition) can shape decisively the policy demands of citizens (Dunleavy and Ward 1981). In short, parties can and do still lead as well as follow public opinion.

Finally, from the growing thematic emphasis of so many campaigns on party and leader image, it can be tempting to conclude that political competition is increasingly “trivialized” and insubstantial in western democracies. No doubt this is true in a variety of ways, and most of us could probably cite examples of such trivialization. Once again, caution should be exercised in rushing to judgements of this nature. We should at least ask what kinds of “image” campaigns seek to promote, for some are far from trivial or insubstantial. If, for instance, one thinks of the standard models of party competition which have been devised by western political scientists, it is readily apparent that these place primary emphasis on the policy packages which parties put before the electorate. Yet implicit in such models are reputational factors which have nothing to do with the intrinsic (de)merits of the policies alone. For the rational and serious-minded voter must assess the credibility of a policy pledge, as well as its innate character, and considerations of credibility turn, among other things, on the voters’ perception of the competence and veracity of politicians. Thus, it is one thing to think that a politician has a good policy for alleviating unemployment, but it is quite another to believe that s/he is likely to (a) keep their word if returned to office, or (b) prove competent to follow through on the intent of the policy. This implies that it is rational and important for any organization campaigning for office to concentrate part of its efforts on fostering certain kinds of reputation – reputations for integrity, veracity and competence, in particular. These are essentially matters of image-building, which may relate to either the leadership or the party in general. This must always be borne in mind when reflecting on the place of imagery in a party’s campaign efforts; while one cannot deny that some aspects of a campaign may indeed be trivial, it is equally likely that many of its image-related features are designed to sell the competence or integrity of a party and its leading protagonists. This is a vital and rational part of the democratic process. To give one example, the British Conservative Party’s sudden and dramatic loss of its long-cherished reputation for economic competence on the occasion of the Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis of September 16, 1992, almost certainly undermined any of its subsequent economic policy initiatives and contributed substantially to Labour electoral landslide in May 1997 (King 1997: 186). Labour lost no opportunity during the intervening period of launching attacks which aimed at reminding voters that the Tories could no longer be trusted to run the economy in a competent manner.

In short, parties and their organizations have shown many signs of change as they have sought to adapt to the altered political, social and technological environments in which they find themselves, and they undoubtedly will have further adaptations to negotiate in the future. For all that – indeed, because of that – they remain stubbornly persistent entities with important roles to play at the heart of the contemporary democratic process.

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Table 1. Three Stages in the Development of Election Campaigning

	Stage I	Stage II	
<i>Technical developments</i>			
Campaign preparations	Short-term; ad hoc	Long-term; specialist committee established 1-2 years in advance of election	“Perma special
Use of media	“Direct” & “indirect” Direct=party press, newspaper ads, billboards Indirect=newspaper coverage	Emphasis on “indirect” Direct=ad campaigns Indirect=public relations, media training, press conferences	Empha Direct- videon Indirec
<i>Resource developments</i>			
Campaign organization	Decentralized Local party organization Little standardization Staffing: party/candidate-based, voluntary	Nationalization, centralization Staffing: party-based, salaried professional	Decent scrutin Staffin profess leader’
Agencies, consultants	Minimal use; “generalist” role Politicians in charge	Growing prominence of “specialist” consultants Politicians still in charge	Consul Intern “Who
Sources of feedback	Impressionistic, “feel” Important role of canvassers, group leaders	Large-scale opinion polls More scientific	Great Interac
<i>Thematic developments</i>			
Campaign events	Public meetings Whistle-stop tours	TV debates; press conferences “Pseudo-events”	As bef
Targeting of voters	Social class support base Maintain vote of specific social categories	Catch-all Trying to mobilize voters across all categories	Market Targeti
Campaign communication	Propaganda	Selling concept	Market

Table 2. The Campaign “Environment”

	TV spots	Leaders’ “debates” ^a	Restrictions on TV access ^b	Other campaign restrictions
Australia	Yes	Yes	E/P? ^c	
Austria	Yes	Yes	Proportionate	
Belgium	No	Yes	E/P? ^c	
Canada	Yes	Yes	E/P? ^c	limits on expend.; 72-hour ban on polls ^d
Denmark	No	Yes	Equal	
Finland	No	Yes	Equal	
France	No	Yes	Equal	limits on expend.; 7-day ban on polls
Germany	Yes	Yes	Proportionate	
Ireland	No	Yes	Proportionate	
Italy	Yes	No	No	7-day ban on polls
Japan	Yes	Yes	E/P? ^c	limits on expend.; candidate restrictions ^f
Netherlands	No	Yes	No	
New Zealand	Yes	Yes	Proportionate	limits on candidates’
expend.	No			
Norway	No	Yes	No	
Sweden	Yes	Yes	Equal	
Switzerland	No	No	E/P? ^c	
U.K.	No	No	Proportionate	limits on local
expend.	No (?) ^e			
U.S.	Yes	Yes	No	limits on Pres.
expend.	Yes (for Pres.)			

- Notes:*
- a In some cases (notably Scandinavia), there is little actual debate between the candidates, who are instead quizzed by a panel of journalists.
 - b In some cases by law, in others, rules set by broadcasters.
 - c At this point, we are uncertain whether rules are for equal or proportionate access.
 - d Not including Quebec
 - e May be about to change?
 - f Most of the restrictions are focused on candidates (not parties), among them: ban on campaigning until final 15 days; no doorstep canvassing; restrictions on speech-making and on distribution of written materials.

Table 3. Party election campaign expenditure in ten West European countries, 1960s-90s: decennial averages (millions of US\$ at constant prices)

Country	No. of parties	Total average party expenditure per decade				% change 1970s-80s
		1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	
Austria	3	18.7 (3) ^a	21.8 (4)	18.1 (2)	21.3 (1)	-
Belgium	8		19.5 (1)	20.3 (2)		
Denmark	4		1.8 (3) ^b	2.2 (4)		
Finland	3		1.5 (3)	1.7 (2)		
Ireland	3		1.3 (1)	3.4 (5)		10
Italy	7		34.5 (2)	31.7 (2)		
Netherlands	4 ^c	1.8 (1)	2.5 (2)	2.5 (4)		
Norway	5		3.6 (1)	3.8 (3)		
Sweden	3	5.6 (3)	8.1 (4)	6.6 (3)		-
United Kingdom	2	13.4 (2)	10.0 (4)	16.7 (2)		0

Notes: Figure in parentheses are the numbers of elections making up the decennial averages. The data have been standardized using cost of living deflators (base year of 1987), and have been converted to US\$ at the average 1987 exchange rate.

a includes 1959

b SF 1979 expenditure not available; have used 1978 figures instead

c prior to 1977, we are aggregating the figures for ARP, CHU and KVP

Sources: Katz and Mair (eds) 1992; International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1979; World Bank, World Tables 1992

Table 4. Quantitative Changes in the Resourcing of West European Political Parties

Country	Party	Central staff	Sub-national staff	Parliamentary staff	Central party income	Subsidies to central party
AUSTRIA	SPO	+ 9 (12%)	-15 (11%)	+ 25 (278%)	+17,709,495 (210%)	+ 5,989,741 (384%)
	OVP	+ 30 (60%)	-	+ 16 (178%)	+ 8,318,058 (248%)	+ 4,939,119 (358%)
	FPO	+ 8 (160%)	-	+ 9 (180%)	+ 570,035 (27%)	+ 669,911 (328%)
Summary of national change	growth average period	3/3 + 15.6 (36%) 1966-1990	0/1 - 15 (11%) 1966-1990	3/3 + 16.6 (217%) 1966-1990	3/3 + 8,865,863 (192%) 1975-1990	3/3 + 3,866,260 (369%) 1975-1990
DENMARK	SF	+ 7 (+350%)	- 1.0 (100%)	0.0 (0%)	+ 978,121 (316%)	+ 306,549
	SD	- 2 (9%)	+ 4.0 (133%)	+43.0 (1433%)	+ 1,372,784 (46%)	+ 688,988
	RV	+ 4.0 (80%)	-	-	+ 304,615 (60%)	+ 146,119
	KRF	+ 5.0 (500%)	0.0 (0%)	+ 3.0 (100%)	+ 113,545 (36%)	+ 55,673
	CD	+ 2.0 (200%)	0.0 (0%)	+ 2.0 (18%)	+ 29,878 (24%)	+ 112,563
	V	+ 6.0 (75%)	0.0 (0%)	+ 18.0 (360%)	-	-
	KF	+ 7.0 (64%) b	0.0 (0%)	+ 19.0 (+317%)	-	-
Summary of national change	growth average period	6/7 +2.9 (33%) 1972-1989	1/6 + 0.8 (42%) 1972-1989	5/6 + 14.6 (352%) 1972-1989	5/5 + 559,789 (66%) 1975-1988	5/5 + 261,978¹ 1975-1988
FINLAND	SKDL	- 0.6 (4%)	- 1.0 (6%)	+2.2 (220%)	- 2,017,001 (37%)	- 2,463,762 (51%)
	SDP	+ 16.8 (+191%)	- 1.6 (-10%)	+ 7.0 (700%)	- 1,936,205 (18%)	- 980,540 (13%)
	KESK	+ 6.8 (42%)	+ 22.0 (105%)e	+ 5.2 (520%)	- 608,901 (11%)	- 399,314 (8%)
	SFP	+ 3.8 (40%)	+ 2.0 (44%)	+ 1.0 (100%)	+ 167,428 (12%)	+ 275,173 (32%)
	KOK	+ 29.0 (220%)	+ 21.8 (436%)	+ 5.4 (540%)	+ 654,454 (10%)	+ 591,374 (13%)
Summary of national change	growth average period	4/5 + 11.2 (91%) 1960-1989	3/5 + 3.2 (17.8%) 1965-1989	5/5 + 3.8 (279%) 1965-1989	2/5 - 748,045 (13%) 1975-1987	2/5 - 595,414 (13%) 1975-1987
W.GERMANY	SPD	+ 22 (40%)	-6 (2%)	+735 (443%)	-20,061,287 (34%)	-10,233,702 (28%)
	CDU ²	+ 43 (28%)	-	+1102 (532%)	- 6,921,906 (12%)	+ 3,330,164 (11%)
	FDP	-	-	+253 (1012%)	- 811,910 (7%)	+ 2,441,941 (+34%)

Summary of national change	growth average period	2/2 +20.0 (8.6%) 1972-1989	0/1 -6 (2%) 1972-1989	3/3³ +696.6 (525%) 1969-1989	0/3 - 9,265,034 (22%) 1972-1987	2/3 - 1,487,199 (6%) 1972-1987
Country	Party	Central staff	Sub-national staff	Parliamentary staff	Central party income	Subsidies to central party
IRELAND	LAB	+ 6 (200%)	-	+ 11 (1100%)	+ 252,196 (151%)	-
	FG	+ 17 (213%)	-	+ 52 (1300%)	+ 710,823 (219%)	+ 76,079 (88%)
	FF	+ 20 (333%)	-	+ 63 (900%)	+ 187,441 (24%)	-
Summary of national change	growth average period	3/3 + 13.7 (216%) 1965-1989	-	3/3 + 42 (105%) 1975-1989	3/3 + 383,487 (91%) 1977-1989	1/1 + 76,079 (88%) -
NL	PvdA	+ 26.6 (73%)	-	+ 14.4 (+17%)	+ 2,152,238 (58%)	+ 7,818 (71%)
	PSP	+ 1.0 (33%)	-	+ 2.5 (71%)	-	-
	PPR	+ 8.0 (400%)	-	+ 6.0 (600%)	+ 158,723 (66%)	+ 9,724 (109%)
	CDA ⁴	- 35.5 (103%)	-	+17.7 (23%)	+ 2,325,865 (212%)	- 5,998 (29%)
	D'66	+ 3.0 (75%)	-	+ 8.3 (237%)	+ 229,378 (56%)	+ 9,841 (114%)
	VVD	+ 1.0 (+6%)	-	+ 9.0 (22%)	-	-
Summary of national change	growth average period	5/6 + 8.5 (61%) 1970-1989	-	6/6 + 4.3 (11%) 1980-1989	4/4 + 1,216,551 (90%) 1973-1986	3/4 + 5,346 (43%) 1973-1986
NORWAY	SE/SV	+ 5 (100%)	0 (0%)	- 2 (40%)	- 66,857 (8%)	-
	DNA	+ 10 (37%)	+ 5 (22%)	+ 15 (500%)	- 1,491,643 (35%)	+ 118,251 (5%)
	SP	+ 6 (120%)	+ 2 (11%)	+ 5 (250%)	-	-
	KRF	+ 5 (50%)	+ 10 (100%)	+ 2 (40%)	-	-
	V	+ 2 (40%)	+ 1 (20%)	+ 1 (50%)	+ 295,196 (76%)	- 9,979 (4%)
	H	- 5 (24%)	- 3 (4%)	+ 10 (250%)	- 250,100 (7%)	+ 780,475 (7%)
	FRP	+ 3 (150%)	0 (0%)	+ 1 (50%)	-	-
Summary of national change	growth average period	6/7 + 6.5 (59%) 1965-1989	4/7 - 2.5 (16%) 1973-1989	6/7 + 4.6 (139%) 1973-1989	1/4 - 378,351 (16%) 1973-1989	2/3 + 296,249 (23%) 1973-1989
SWEDEN	SAP	+ 48.0 (149%)	-	-	- 1,715,623 (10%)	- 2,817,515 (31%)
	VPK	+ 12.4 (248%)	-	-	- 920,805 (33%)	- 958,983 (42%)
	C	+ 11.2 (86%)	-	+ 6.8 (74%)	- 1,913,091 (29%)	- 2,950,800 (53%)

	FP	+ 10.4 (69%)	+ 16.2 (27%)	+ 6.8 (94%)	- 492,303 (12%)	- 1,022,595 (30%)
	MOD	- 4.2 (7%)	- 6.0 (16%) ^e	-	- 1,661,606 (20%)	+ 76,483(2%)
Country	Party	Central staff	Sub-national staff	Parliamentary staff	Central party income	Subsidies to central party
Summary of national change	growth average period	4/5 + 11.5 (39%) 1965-1989	1/2 - 10.2 (16%) 1965-1989	2/2 +6.8 (83%) 1970-1989	0/5 - 1,340,686 (17%) 1976-1988	1/5 - 1,534,682 (32%) 1976-1988
UK	CON	+ 3 (3%)	-289 (50%)	-	+ 4,122,996 (44%)	-
	LAB	+ 21 (42%)	-153 (62%)	-	+ 1,984,059 (30%)	-
	LIB	+ 6 (32%)	- 66 (89%)	-	+ 1,018,206 (133%)	-
Summary of national change	growth average period	3/3 +10 (18%) 1960-1989	0/3 -169 (56%) 1960-1989	- - -	3/3 + 2,375,070 (42%) 1974-1987	- - -

Source: Katz & Mair 1992.

General Notes:

'Growth' refers to the number of parties in the system showing either net staff growth at a given level or a real increase in income/subsidies received across the period analysed; thus, '5/6' under central staff indicates that 5 out of 6 parties in the system increased the number of staff employed in their national head offices.

'Average' refers to the mean rate of change across the specified period in terms of both raw units and percentage. Only parties which can be compared across the specified period are included in calculations of overall national averages.

'Period' refers to the two years across which change is measured; the precise period analysed varies from case to case according to data availability, but is generally from the earliest possible date in the 1960s through to the late 1980s for staff and from the mid-1970s to late 1980s for finance. Note that financial comparisons have deliberately been restricted to years in which general elections took place.

Figures for income and subsidies refer to net changes in real value terms, with prices standardized at 1987 levels and expressed in US dollars. Cost of living deflators are taken from the International Statistics Yearbook, 1979 and the World Bank's World Tables 1992. Exchange rates used are those for December 1987, as reported in The Times.

Specific Notes:

Table 5. Average central party incomes and subsidies

Country	Average income at beginning of period	Average income at end of period	Average subsidy at beginning of period	Average subsidy at end of period
Austria	4,627,266	13,113,105	1,047,266	3,866,257
Denmark	843,318	1,403,107	n.a.	261,980
Finland	5,998,872	5,250,827	4,497,790	3,902,376
Germany	42,105,303	32,840,272	24,587,309	23,099,993
Ireland	423,375	806,862	86,730	162,809
Netherlands	1,357,352	2,575,403	12,359	17,705
Norway	2,308,032	1,929,681	1,317,906	1,614,155
Sweden	7,722,020	6,381,342	4,860,640	3,325,958
UK	5,656,539	8,031,609	n.a.	n.a.

Note: All figures expressed in US dollars, standardized at 1987 price levels (see Table 3).

Source: As per Table 3.

¹ It is not possible to calculate the percentage change this represents given that growth is from no subsidy at all.

² These figures are for the CDU and CSU combined.

³ Parliamentary staff data for the Federal German Republic's parties include part-time employees. This is not true of other countries, and therefore gives an exaggerated impression of Germany's parliamentary party resources, though these are almost certainly great in comparative perspective.

⁴ CDA figures are calculated by aggregating data for the CHU, KVP and ARP for the earlier time point in the comparison.